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The NLRA's Legacy: 
Collective or Individual 
Dispute Resolution or Not? 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow* 
I. Introduction 
In this brief essay, I review the legacy of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA)l on labor and employment dispute resolution, as well 
as on other areas of human disputing. The processes that grew around 
labor rights-including collective bargaining, negotiation, arbitration, 
mediation, med-arb, and other impasse-breaking techniques-are good 
developments. This variety of processes demonstrates that there are 
other forms of dispute resolution, rather than winner-take-all litiga-
tion; brute struggles of power within unassisted negotiation; or, worse, 
violent conflict. Labor processes, beginning with collective bargaining 
and grievance arbitration that became hybridized and more complex-
such as grievance mediation and med-arb2-were important innova-
tions that have spawned a new field in dispute resolution called dispute 
system design.3 But, in what many regard as a distortion of using alter-
native processes, arbitration specified in mandatory, pre-dispute con-
tracts of individual employees (and now all other kinds of contracts) 
and then interpreted to be the only form of dispute resolution available 
to the contracting parties is a controversial legacy that is hardly pro-
ducing labor peace.4 Indeed, the very goals of collective employment 
rights may be eroding as rulings from nonunion individual employ-
·Chancellor's Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law, and 
A.B. Chettle Jr. Professor of Law, Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure, Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151~9 (2006). 
2. Stephen B. Goldberg, Grievance Mediation: A Successful Alternative to Labor 
Arbitration, 5 NEGOTIATION J. 9 (1989). 
3. See WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DlSPUTES REsoLVED: DEsIGNING SYsTEMS TO CUT 
THE COSTS OF CONFLICTS 41-64 (1988). 
4. Since the Gilmer decision, employment lawyers (often joined by consumer law-
yers) have been lobbying heavily for new laws to prohibit the mandatory use of pre-
dispute arbitration in employment and other contracts. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Congo 
(2009); Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past 
Quarter Century, 25 A.B.A.J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 415-34 (2010) (reviewing the full extent 
of the controversies on this issue). 
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ment matters (and commercial contracts more generally) are blending 
with and eviscerating collective rights.5 The legal processes that have 
developed around the separation of legal concepts and consciousness6 
of employment (seen as individual rights) and labor (seen as collective 
rights) are the major themes of this essay.7 
In this examination of the NLRA's legacy, it is important to rec-
ognize how much processes used in labor-management relations have 
given us but also how different processes for different purposes might 
be essential for producing not only labor peace, but labor justice. As 
I have argued about processes in general, process pluralism,8 pro-
cess choice, and variety may be essential for delivering some form 
of justice in different contexts. Labor relations might benefit from 
learning that lesson: one size will not fit all. In fact, participants in 
labor-management disputes often by rote choose conventional labor 
dispute resolution processes-such as limited labor negotiation and 
bargaining strategies and then mandatory commitment to grievance 
arbitration-without paying sufficient attention to other forms of 
dispute resolution, such as mediation for both collective, union-man-
agement, and individual issues and disputes. My own views of what 
processes are best used for what kind of work disputes have changed 
over time, even as I completed this essay.9 
In assessing the legacy of the NLRA and the labor dispute resolu-
tion processes that have grown up around it, we must consider some 
important issues in modern labor relations and dispute resolution: 
5. Though beyond the scope of this essay, the question of whether class actions can 
be conducted in arbitral fora parallels refusals to allow collective justice processes to 
proceed in a variety of fora. The Supreme Court recently considered whether an arbitra-
tion panel's decision potentially allowing a matter to proceed as a class action should be 
allowed to stand. The Court vacated the panel's award on the ground that the arbitrators 
had exceeded their powers in violation of section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
US.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006), where the parties had not explicitly agreed to allow class arbitra-
tion. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
6. A focus on the legal consciousness of labor regulators, organizers, and workers 
is an old story in labor law. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner 
Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 
268 (1978). 
7. I am most certainly not alone in making these claims. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, 
The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theo-
retical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U L. REV. 687 (1997); Marion Crain & Ken 
Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1767 (2001); Wilma B. Liebman, Labor 
Law Inside Out, 11 WORKINoUSA: J. LAB. & Soc'y 9, 19-20 (2008); Sharon Rabin Margal-
ioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's Decline, 
16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMF. L.J. 133 (1998). 
8. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes 
of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553 (2006). 
9. In this essay, I use the term work, which is a more capacious and fruitful term 
for developing collective consciousness than labor or employment. 
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1. When is justice best achieved through collective (whether union 
or other forms of class or group-based action) versus individual 
actions? 
2. Which processes (bargaining and negotiation, mediation, arbi-
tration, litigation, or other hybridized forms of dispute resolu-
tion) are best utilized for which kinds of labor disputes?10 
3. What processes are more likely to produce access to relief and 
effective relations and remedies in the high-conflict arena 
of labor relations, including new forms of mediated labor-
management partnerships?l1 
4. Having spawned different dispute resolution processes, can 
labor and management learn to use different forms of process 
to reconfigure their relations in a new era, both in process and 
in substance?12 
5. What is the relation of collective rights, processes, and rem-
edies to individual rights, processes, and remedies in the labor 
context? 
In this essay, I want to urge the labor, employment, and fair work 
movements to consider more varied use of processes-including new 
hybrid forms of multiparty union-management partnerships, facili-
tated integrative interest-based bargaining, and consensus-building 
mechanisms-to expand our repertoires of devices available to resolve 
the more complex work disputes arising in today's difficult economy. 
ll. A Brief History of the NLRA and 
the Dispute Processes 
The use of different forms of dispute resolution has long been as-
sociated with labor relations. Even before the enactment of the NLRA, 
the Railway Labor Act13 provided for the use of mediation and arbitra-
tion in a unionized context. Until the decision in Circuit City Stores 
Inc. v. Adams,14 where the Supreme Court applied the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA)16 to ordinary nonunion employment contracts in most 
circumstances, it was generally thought that arbitration was a process 
most associated with collective bargaining and grievance processes.16 
10. NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE: FROM THE WORKPLACE TO SOCIETY (Thomas A. Kochan & 
David B. Lipsky eds., 2003). 
11. See, e.g., THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., HEALING ToGETHER: THE LABoR-MANAGEMENT 
PARTNERSHIP AT KAIsER PERMANENTE (2009). 
12. See, e.g., CYNTInA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FRoM SELF-REGULATION 
TO CO-REGULATION (2010). 
13. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2006). 
14. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
15. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006). 
16. This turned on the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1 of the FAA, 9 
U.S.C. § 1 (2006), which defines the Act's coverage. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. That 
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The passage of the NLRA in 1935 was intended to usher in an era 
of collective rights for workers and labor peace where there had been 
labor strife. Designed to grant workers the rights to collectively orga-
nize and negotiate for fair conditions of employment-including hours, 
wages, and other elements of work life-through a collective bargaining 
agreement with their employers, the Act was and still is controversial. 
Both advocates of labor rights and employers claimed the Act granted 
too much to "the other side."17 As a condition of promoting labor peace, 
the judiciary recognized the value of internal grievance processes, usu-
ally arbitration,18 to sort out internal labor disputes. is Eventually both 
the judiciary and legislatures recognized the benefit of mediation and 
arbitration to break bargaining impasses in the labor contract forma-
tion context.2O These forms of dispute resolution satisfied an important 
procedural goal: they were alternatives to violence, con1lict, courts, and 
section excludes coverage of "contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, 
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. I 1. 
Many scholars believe that the FAA was clearly intended only to cover commercial arbi-
trations. Others believe that the exclusion was framed this way because this particular 
class of workers (workers in interstate commerce, such as seaman and railroad employ-
ees), already were required to use their own arbitration and dispute resolution processes 
under the Railway Labor Act. These two acts were passed at about the same time, 1925 
to 1926. 
17. One of the lasting legacies of the NLRA is the ongoing polarization of labor and 
management interests. Over the years, many labor and dispute resolution practitioners 
have tried to narrow this gap with interest-based bargaining and other integrative ap-
proaches to labor relations, but we seem to be unable to climb out of an adversarial and 
increasingly polarizing frame for worker-employer relationships. See, e.g., NEGOTIATIONS 
AND CHANGE, supra note 10; RICHARD E. WALTON & RoBERT McKERslE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY 
OF LABoR RELATIONS (1965). At the time of its passage, the NLRA was opposed by left 
pro-labor groups who thought the Act was designed to pacify and deceive workers, as 
well as by most business interests who perceived collective labor rights as infringing 
on their freedom to control the workplace through freedom of contract. See KENNETH G. 
DAU-ScHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 50 (2009); Richard A. 
Epstein, One Bridge Tho Far: Why the Employee Free Choice Act Rightly Fell Short (Univ. 
of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 528, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com! 
abstract=l660683. But it is also true that there have been some successful efforts at 
more collaborative labor-management relations, including coalitions and partnerships 
of many unions in several workplaces, within a single industry. See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., 
supra note 11. 
18. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). 
19. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (collectively, Steel-
workers' Trilogy). The Court stated: "The present federal policy is to promote industrial 
stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement. A m~or factor in achieving 
industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the col-
lective bargaining agreement." Warrior & GulfNavigatwn Co., 363 U.S. at 578 (internal 
citations omitted). 
20. See Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. II 151-88 (2006). Another example is the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service created as a separate federal agency in 1947 at 
the time of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act. See Labor Management 
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, I 202, 61 Stat. 136,153 (1947). 
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later even administrative agencies, and they were charged with the 
legal obligations to enforce labor and contract rights.21 
The use of arbitration in labor relations is both much older than 
many people think. and quite relevant to our current issues. In both 
England and the United States in the late nineteenth century, dur-
ing the period of the worst and most violent labor actions and strikes, 
both sides of the labor conflict suggested compulsory arbitration. Al-
ternatively, labor and management frequently requested compulsory 
investigation of disputes by an impartial body to attempt to settle dis-
putes.22 However, the parties still voluntarily had to accept proposed 
findings and outcomes, making such processes more like evaluative 
mediation or nonbinding arbitration than binding arbitration as we 
know it today.23 Arbitration has been frequently used in railroad and 
airline industry disputes, and the mediation and conciliation services 
of the predecessors to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services 
(now an independent federal agency) actually date from 1918 as a 
branch of the Department of Labor.24 What we now call "alternative 
dispute resolution" or, in more modem parlance, "appropriate dispute 
resolution," has a much longer history associated with labor relations 
in its collective employment form. The U.S. Conciliation Service per-
formed mediation and arbitration services on jurisdictional work dis-
putes, such as which building trades could perform certain classes of 
work. It mediated such disputes and created more permanent fora for 
arbitrating those disputes. The American Federation of Labor's (AFL) 
Joint Board on Jurisdictional Disputes was, what one commentator has 
called, an early form of "dispute system design."26 Both world wars (the 
first before the NLRA was enacted and the second afterward) spurred 
the development of War Labor Boards, which used arbitral processes 
to resolve labor conflicts in times of labor shortages where there was 
21. These labor- and employment-related agencies initially included the National 
Labor Relations Board and the Department of Labor (for wage and hour enforcement) 
and, later, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other federal and state 
agencies charged with enforcing labor and employment laws. 
22. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 60-68 (1983); JEROME T. BARRETI' & 
JOSEPH P. BARRETI', A HIsToRY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE REsoLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITI-
CAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT 86-91, 99 (2004). 
23. See JOHN T. DuNLop & ARNOLD M. :lACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF EMPLOY-
MENT DISPUTES 3 (1997). This practice, again sought by labor groups as part of the Em-
ployee Free Choice Act, is called interest arbitration (in formation of collective bargaining 
agreements or settlement of union and collective labor disputes), as distinguished 
from grievance arbitration, or disputes arising under an existing collective bargaining 
agreement. 
24. See FMCS: Who We Are-Our History, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, 
http://www.fmcs.govlintemetlitemDetail.asp?categoryID=21&itemID=15810 (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2011). 
25. BARRETI' & BARRETI', supra note 22, at 106. 
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great need for minimal production disruptions.26 Labor-management 
cooperation, labor codes, and temporary recognition of trade unions or 
bargaining agents developed as precursors to many of the processes 
now used to resolve labor disputes. But the interwar years were also 
a time of great labor conflict, due to both the Depression and the mass 
dislocation of unemployed workers. 
The New Deal formulation of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(declared unconstitutional)27 and later the NLRA (declared constitu-
tional)2B finally established official legal rights to bargain collectively in 
1935. Thus, federal law formally recognized the dispute resolution pro-
cesses of negotiation and bargaining. The case law, developed first by 
the National Labor Relations Board and ultimately by the courts, never 
required more than good-faith bargaining and thus could not compel 
agreements to be reached or impose substantive terms on the parties.29 
However, certain subjects, such as the contracting out of work, were 
deemed subject to mandatory bargaining under NLRA section 8(d).30 In 
a theme I will return to below, the NLRA firmly enshrined in the law the 
requirement that employers and representatives of the employees must 
"confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and 
conditions of employment," even if"such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."31 
This important statutory duty is one of the NLRA's lasting legacies 
of dispute resolution as various bodies, courts, and scholars now dis-
cuss what good-faith bargaining requires in a variety of other dispute 
resolution fora, including court-based mediation and arbitration.32 In a 
somewhat ironic twist, good-faith bargaining under the NLRA has been 
interpreted to mean a very low de minimis standard of negotiation; in 
some contexts, merely showing up is enough. This is in sharp contrast 
to more modern theories of problem-solving negotiation, which suggest 
that good-faith bargaining actually means looking for integrative solu-
tions to problems that involve both shared and conflicting interests.33 
26. DAVID I. LEvINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: How BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN 
BOTH WTN 148 (1995). 
27. See Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
28. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
29. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1962); NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 
361 U.S. 477, 483-90 (1960); see also Hardesty Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 259-61 (2001), en-
forced, 308 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating standards of what constitutes "bad faith" or 
"surface" bargaining). 
30. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,213 (1964). 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
32. See, e.g., John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Metlwds to Promote Good-
Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REv. 69 
(2002). 
33. See RooER FIsHER ET AL., GET1'ING TO YES: NEGOTlATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GlV-
TNG IN (2d ed. 1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 7bwardAnother Vzew of Legal Negotiation: 
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 826-27 (1984). 
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In both the Railway Labor Act and most public employment set-
tings, federal and state governments may actually require mediation 
and arbitration and compel certain forms of bargaining and agree-
ments. These government requirements establish stronger precedents 
for the use of different forms of dispute resolution processes, with a lit-
tle bit more substantive bite. Thus, public employment statutes often 
model a panoply or menu of dispute resolution processes, including 
mediation, fact-finding, and both interest and grievance arbitration 
that must be used to resolve labor disputes. These dispute resolution 
processes are then balanced with a prohibition or some limitations on 
the right of public employees to strike. S4 This recognition of a wider 
possibility of processes to choose from-including both consensual 
(negotiation and mediation) and command (arbitration) processes-is 
closer to what is available in the larger dispute resolution world of 
civil disputes. 
In Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court authorized the development 
of federal substantive labor law and recognized an implicit understand-
ing that a contractual agreement to arbitrate "is the quid pro quo for 
an agreement not to strike."85 Following the deferential standard of 
review for contract grievance arbitration in the Steelworkers' Trilogy, 
arbitration became the norm as the legal process for the resolution of 
labor disputes.36 Arbitration was more fully recognized in the Labor 
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947.37 
Initially, commercial arbitration developed on a separate track, 
which was fully recognized by Justice Douglas in one of the Steelwork-
ers cases: 
In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. 
Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitra-
tion of labor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration 
under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by 
courts [in Wilko v. Swan38] toward arbitration of commercial agree-
ments has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes under col-
lective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective 
bargaining process itsel£89 
34. Tim Schooley, Comment, TIre Reinstatement Rights of Striking Public Employ· 
ees, 9 INDus. REL. L.J. 283, 283-84 (1987). 
35. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 US. 448, 455 (1957). 
36. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 US. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Warrior &; Gulf Navigating Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel &; Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960). 
37. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of29 US.C.). 
as. 346 US. 427 (1953) (refusing to allow contractual arbitration in a case involv-
ing statutory securities claims). 
39. Warrior & Gulf Navigating Co., 363 US. at 578. 
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AB judicial hostility to commercial arbitration was dislodged in a se-
ries of cases decided by the Supreme COurt,40 the dividing line between 
commercial, employment, and now labor dispute resolution began to 
disappear.41 
Though the NLRA was intended primarily to apply to collective 
bargaining and union issues in formal recognition of the substantive 
right collectively to bargain,42 it has had a much broader legacy in ap-
plication of its processes to what we now call employment issues-issues 
that deal with the working conditions and rights of employees-rather 
than labor issues-issues protected by collective union rights. 
m. Employment Versus Labor 
Rights and Remedies 
This rhetorical device of separating labor from employment issues 
is, in my view, key to understanding the current separation of collective 
and individual rights consciousness in employees and in the laws and 
processes that claim to protect those rights. Whether modern American 
workers will ever regain a sense of collective interests in work issues 
is a major question in assessing the NLRA's legacy. To what extent are 
processes to resolve disputes of labor and employment issues experi-
enced as collective or individual in structure and delivery? And of key 
importance to this issue, who has the right or authority to determine 
which processes will be used (e.g., employers, in mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in contracts; unions, in collective bargaining agree-
ments; or individuals, in legal claims asserted under contracts and 
statutes)? What are the implications of whether rights and remedies 
are pursued at individual or collective levels? 
While we continue to argue about the substantive legacy of the 
NLRA and whether unionization is alive or dead, the dispute resolu-
tion processes that have grown up around the NLRA may continue to 
affect workers' rights and conditions of employment beyond the pro-
tection of particular substantive and collective rights afforded by the 
NLRA itself. During the civil rights movement in the 1960s and later, 
more and more statutory protections were provided to some workers 
on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, age, and disability. 
Congress faced the choice of which enforcement mechanisms to select 
for these new laws. The EEOC was not granted the full authority and 
40. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAm. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); 
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Why the Supreme 
Court reversed its hostility to commercial arbitration is a subject of much academic and 
practice commentary. My own view is a cynical one-of the desire of the Court to reduce 
its docket and to remove certain classes of cases from its consideration. 
41. Stephen L. Hayford, Unificatwn of tM Law of Labor Arbitratwn and Commer-
cial Arbitratwn: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 781, 925-27 (2000). 
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006). 
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power, as an administrative agency, to issue self-executing but appeal-
able orders. Instead, individual litigants (and larger groups of litigants 
in class actions) sued directly for redress, often gaining reinstatement, 
back pay, attorneys' fees, and eventually compensatory damages.43 
Litigation of employment civil rights was the norm until another 
form of arbitration-contractual or pre-dispute mandatory assignment 
to employment arbitration-was imposed on individual employees. Ini-
tially, only those not represented by unions were in such relationships, 
but now most workers may theoretically be subject to some type of man-
datory dispute resolution.44 Mandatory pre-dispute contractual em-
ployment arbitration (also known as "cram down" arbitration) grew up 
alongside commercial arbitration under the FAA. The FAA has, over the 
last few decades, been applied to both employment and consumer con-
tracts. Courts have upheld employment arbitration agreements in the 
face of diverse legal objections including whether they violate contract 
law (unconscionability), constitutional law (denial of rights to trial by 
jury), and procedural principles (denial of various due process rights).4Ii 
American judicial holdings directly contrast with legal developments 
in other parts of the world, where compulsory pre-dispute contractual 
arbitration cannot be applied to employment or consumer issues.46 
As I recall, writing my student law review note in 1973 about the 
inevitable interplay between the NLRA and Title VII,47 my concern was 
with the potential substantive clashes between statutory schemes that 
protected collective versus more individual rights. For example, collec-
tive rights protect seniority. But these rights may conflict with indi-
vidual rights, such as the antidiscrimination protections of Title VII for 
more recently hired minority and female workers, who are more likely 
to be laid off under seniority agreements. Of course, as I and others had 
written at the time and since,48 this was also interpreted as a conflict 
43. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2006). 
44. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (holding that provi-
sions in collective bargaining agreements requiring arbitration of individual statutory 
causes of action are enforceable). 
45. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Pow-
ers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1, 10-14 (1997). 
46. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach 
to Mandatory Consumer and EmploymentArbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 
U. MIAMI L. REv. 831 (2002). 
47. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Comment, The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the 
National Labor RelationsAct:ANew Role for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 158 (1974). My 
note was inspired by defense contractors seeking advice about how they could reconcile 
the seniority requirements of their collective bargaining agreements with their most re-
cent hires of minorities and females that had been made to conform to Title VII require-
ments. However, as the Vietnam War wore down, the contractors' layoffs were likely to 
have a disparate impact on the most recently hired minority and female workers. 
48. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 7. 
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between one set of collectivities (mostly white male unions) and other 
collectivities (minority and women workers). In the middle of my writ-
ing that note, the Supreme Court decided Alexander v. Gardne1'-Denver 
Co.,4.S which instead confronted the inevitable interplay of the different 
processes used to assert rights under different employment protective 
schemes, including litigation, labor arbitration of contract grievances, 
and arbitration of statutory employment protections. As I argued then 
(and was called "nalve" by my nationally renowned labor law profes-
sor and friend Howard Lesnick), I urged a recognition that the NLRA 
could be interpreted to treat some of these statutory claims (like dis-
crimination) as another form of unfair labor practice to enforce the 
federal fair labor policies in one setting, in order to promote solidarity 
among all workers and encourage cooperation, not competition, among 
different classes of workers. It was heartening to see some labor law 
scholars urge similar developments, both in legal interpretations and 
in organizing strategies, though we all remain largely unsuccessful. 50 
So as we say in the law, the issues were joined. Which processes 
would be used to vindicate which rights under labor ("the law of the 
shop") and employment laws ("the law of the land")?51 And more impor-
tantly, what impact would different processes have on the adjudication 
of collective rights or individual rights? For many years, both case law 
and scholarly critique focused on the question of whether unions could 
waive, through collective bargaining agreements, both substantive and 
49. 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974). The issue in Alexander was whether an employee/union 
member who lost his discharge case in a grievance arbitration could still file a sepa-
rate discrimination claim in another forum. The Court held that labor arbitration that 
dealt with "the law of the shop" (the collective bargaining agreement) could not preclude 
another proceeding that was designed to deal with "the law of the land" (the statutory 
protections of Title VII). Id. 
50. See sources cited supra note 7. In addition, other scholars like Cynthia Estlund 
and Susan Sturm have urged that discrimination issues and issues of fairness and equity 
in employment generally should be embraced as collective labor issues, uniting rather 
than dividing workers in a more democratic workplace. H all work issues were part of the 
collective consciousness of workers and part of the collective bargaining reginle, then the 
issues of where employment disputes should be resolved (whether in internal grievance 
arbitrations or in employment arbitrations or court) might have been easier to resolve. 
See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE 
DEMOCRACY 145-56 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Emp[Qyment Discrimina-
tion: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 53~5 (2001). 
51. In Gilmer v. Interstate I Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (a much criti-
cized decision), it looked as if mandatory assignment of arbitration processes via employ-
ment contracts would force many statutory employment claims to employer-controlled 
dispute resolution processes. In recent years the worries of many labor and employment 
lawyers that contract-based mandatory assignment to arbitration would be applied to 
union workers also seemed to come true. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 
1474 (2009). For one view that this is not a bad development, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, 
Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration of Unionized Emp[Qyees' 
Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEwls & CLARK L. REv. 861 (2010). 
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procedural statutory rightsll2 or whether unionized employees would 
continue to have the ability to use union grievance arbitration, some 
litigation (in duty of fair representation cases), and individual statu-
tory processes to vindicate statutory claims. For some years, litigants 
argued that important statutory claims representing public policy had 
to be vindicated in courts, not arbitral settings. However, this claim 
was lost in the commercial setting as the Supreme Court allowed pre-
dispute contractual arbitration to resolve antitrust, securities, Racke-
teer In1luenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), and other statutory 
claims.53 Consequently, it was also lost in the employment setting as 
the Supreme Court upheld mandatory assignment to contractual arbi-
tration in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane COrp.54 
The Court in Gilmer held that statutory employment issues are ar-
bitrable.56 From there, the Supreme Court moved through the issues of 
union waivers of statutory rights (Wright'f'6 and the inclusion of statu-
tory rights within collective bargaining agreements with arbitration 
clauses applying to disputes arising out of the collective bargaining 
agreement (Pyett).117 These developments make the use of labor griev-
ance arbitration processes look close to fully merged with contractual 
arbitration. Thus, the employer may use the collective power of the 
union to waive or control the processes used by employees to vindi-
cate both labor and other statutory rights. Efforts to characterize union 
waivers of both statutory rights-and the more restricted waiver of 
class actions in employment arbitration-as unfair labor practices 
under the NLRA have so far failed, even if a few courts have held that 
waivers of class actions in employment settings may constitute uncon-
scionable contracts.68 The legal question of whether class actions in 
arbitration can be waived by contract continues to be litigated in the 
Supreme Court. 59 
52. See, e.g., Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
53. Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAm. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shear-
sonlAm. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
54. 500 U.S. at 23. 
55. [d. 
56. Wright, 525 U.S. at 72. 
57. &e 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009). 
58. See, e.g., Gentry v. Super. Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 575 (Cal. 2007); OFFICE OF THE GEN-
ERAL CoUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. GC 10-06, GUIDELINE MEMORANDUM CONCERNING UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICE CHARGES INvOLVING EMPLOYEE W AIVER8 IN THE CONTEXT OF EMPLOYERS' MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION POlJCIES (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/ shared_files! 
GC%20Memol2010/GC%2010-06%20Guideline%20Memorandum.pdf. 
59. See, e.g., AT &; T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (granting 
certiorari on whether the FAA preempts voiding a class action waiver as unconscionable 
when clauses in arbitration contracts are treated differently from other contract terms). 
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Iv. Which Processes Are Appropriate in 
Which Work Contexts? 
Lawyers representing individual employees, dissenters in Pyett,&O 
and many legal commentators have expressed concerns that permit-
ting unions to waive individual rights to litigate statutory claims is 
not fair because collective interests may conflict with individual in-
terests. However, the majority in Pyett and a few commentators think 
that arbitration, just because it originated in labor processes, may be 
an appropriate forum for resolution of both labor and employment 
issues.51 
Professor Sarah Cole, for example, believes that arbitrators will 
be especially well suited to both factual and legal determinations 
in statutory employment cases,52 although, following the decision in 
Gilmer, many such labor arbitrators and labor specialists thought just 
the opposite.53 Professor Cole also suggests that unions are now more 
likely than in the past to use their experience in collective bargain-
ing grievance arbitration to the advantage of individuals and groups 
with statutory claims in employment arbitration. About a decade ago, 
Professor Richard Bales also suggested that a "comprehensive-arbitral 
approach," which combined arbitration of private (collective bargain-
ing agreement and contractual disputes) with public issues (statutory 
claims) in labor arbitration would be more likely to unify and fortify 
organized labor and preserve the employment relationship. 54 Professor 
Bales, like more recent commentators, argued that the labor arbitral 
forum would prove cheaper and faster and could be fairer than court 
settings for statutory claims, especially for low-wage workers who could 
not easily afford legal representation and litigation costs, thus provid-
ing greater access to justice in the arbitral settings.55 
Extensive empirical research has suggested that employees actu-
ally fare quite well in arbitral settings in some employment cases as 
60. 129 S. Ct. at 1475 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1478 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
61. Most recently, distinguished labor law profeBBor Theodore St. Antoine has 
opined just this on the pages of this journal. See St. Antoine, supra note 4, at 42l. 
62. Cole, supra note 51, at 877-78. 
63. See. e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" 
and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J . 381 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARv. L. REv. 668 (1986); Rob-
ert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public·Law Disputes, 
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Indi· 
vidual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REv. 
1017 (1996). 
64. Bales, supra note 7, at 751--60; see also Becky L. Jacobs, Often Wrong. Never in 
Doubt: How Anti-arbitration Expectancy Bias May Limit Access to Justice, 62 ME. L. REv. 
531 (2010). 
65. See Bales, supra note 7, at 754-59. 
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compared to litigation.66 That is, employees have higher win rates in 
employment arbitration settings, even if actual monetary amounts of 
damages or compensation may not be as great as in some forms of 
litigation, such as jury trials. Some of these commentators also sug-
gested that arbitrating employment claims within the labor grievance 
umbrella would not only benefit workers with cheaper and more expe-
rienced arbitral representatives67 but give union representatives an-
other important role within the workplace. 
Many other scholars and practitioners disagree with this assess-
ment of arbitral justice. 
Since we do not yet have consistent empirical results on the com-
parative efficiency, efficacy, and fairness of arbitral and litigation fora, 
scholars continue to argue this important issue.66 Can unions be trusted 
to fairly represent, in a collective environment, the so-called individual 
interests of employees with statutory claims against their employers? 
Can labor arbitrators fairly and correctly enforce public statutory pro-
visions as well as collective agreements? 
In many respects, I have often thought this to be quite an ironic 
issue. Many of the so-called individual claims of statutory discrimi-
nation are conceptualized by many to be group rights-that is, one's 
individual discrimination claim is actually based on one's member-
66. For summaries of this research, see, for example, Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon 
Sarraf: Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Media· 
tion and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evi-
dence That Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON 
LABOR 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004); Samuel Estreicher, Sat-
urns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559 (2001); Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment 
Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. REsoL. J., May-July 2003, at 8; Lewis L. 
Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F.L. REv. 105 (2003); 
David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for 
Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557 (2005); St. Antoine, supra note 4; see also Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: 
Repeat Players inADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL.19 (1999). 
67. Much of the newer empirical work on success in arbitral fora can often be ex-
plained by the quality or even existence of representatives. See, e.g., Bingham & Sarraf, 
supra note 66; Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 189 (1997). 
68. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution, in OxroRD HANDBOOK OF 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 596 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010); Alexander 
J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound 
and Fury? 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 405 (2007); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth 
Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. 
REsoL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44; Tina Nabatchi & Anya Stanger, Using ADR to 
Resolve Federal Sector EEO Complaints: An Evaluation of Management Directive 110 
(2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3lpapers.cfm?abstract_id=1615038 (paper 
prepared for 23d International Association for Conflict Management Conference); see 
also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, 41 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783 (2008). 
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ship in a group. In the past, with the assumptions of discrimination 
against many of these groups by predominantly white male unions, 
it was thought by many that conflicts existed among groups and that 
one group was better represented by traditional union interests and 
grievance arbitration than the others. Antidiscrimination lawyers have 
long argued that courts and litigation are better for plaintiff-claimants, 
though the empirical research on this question may actually contradict 
this claim.89 Indeed, at least in the earlier days of employment discrim-
ination litigation, the most successful claims were group-based class 
actions, and some of those against unions were successful.70 Tensions 
between groups in the workplace are probably a more accurate descrip-
tion of the inevitable interplay of the NLRA and at least the earlier 
years of Title VII enforcement. 
If more recent commentators are right about the need to organize 
and fairly represent minority and women workers,71 then the issue of 
which processes are best can be separated from who will control that 
process or offer better, faster, cheaper, or more effective representational 
services (union representatives or employment lawyers). And apart 
from post-dispute litigation strategies, the growth of internal dispute 
resolution in the form of ombuds, internal equal opportunity officers, 
other human resource personnel, and complaint or grievance functions 
within large organizations also has caused splits among scholars and 
, practitioners about whether there is more internalized justice in em-
ployment settings. The question still exists whether employees fare bet-
ter or worse in internal organizational settings compared to externally 
litigated processes,72 or whether there is more privatized and individu-
69. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation, 
in ADR & THE LAw 8, 22 (20th ed. 2006); Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL 'y 
J. 547 (2003). 
70. In my early years as a lawyer, I brought several duty of fair representation 
claims against powerful unions on behalf of African-American and female employees. I 
think I lost all of them. For examples of 8uccessful discrimination cases against m~or 
unions, see, for example, Commonwealth of Pa. v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of 0p-
erating Eng'rs, 648 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Int'l Union of 
Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 520, 476 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1973); see also A Leon 
Higginbotham Jr., The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Raymond Williams, et al. 
vs. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 60 J. NEGRO HIsT. 360 
(1975) (opinion on recusal motion against African-American federal judge in proceeding 
against union for race discrimination). 
71. And some argue that worker solidarity for both union PUl'P08e8 and nondis-
crimination purposes is best served when workers see their common goals. See ES'l'LUND, 
supra note 50; see also Sturm, supra note 50. 
72. See Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 
2007 J. DIsP. REsoL. 1,4 (suggesting that systematizing employee grievances in certain 
ombuds settings can lead to systemic change in the workplace, perhaps more effectively 
than in formal, external, and public litigation). 
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alized (and, ultimately, pacified) justice in employment settings.73 It 
is sometimes not clear to me whether the arguments are about which 
processes will provide better or more efficient justice for the disputants 
or which dispute resolution professionals (union representatives, em-
ployment lawyers, internal organizational human resource personnel, 
or dispute resolution personnel) will benefit from the process chosen. 
While the debates continue about whether mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration in the employment setting harms individual interests in 
employment equity, outside of employment settings, the controversies 
about mandatory arbitration in consumer and other settings have pre-
sented another relevant challenge. Without fully reviewing the now 
complex legal landscape of class action litigation in consumer and 
other settings, it is instructive to note here that in a series of recent 
cases, the Supreme Court has been ruling in ways that signal disap-
proval of the use of the class action form in contractual arbitration.74 
Thus, collective action in dispute resolution may be as endangered in 
the nonunion, nonemployment context as in employment and labor re-
lations generally. 
On the other hand, the need for collective action, especially in 
these troubled economic times, could not be greater. In times of scarce 
resources, negotiations and other forms of dispute resolution are much 
more likely to become zero-sum distributive processes rather than occa-
sions for exploring, sharing, and integrating processes and outcomes.75 
AB unions struggle with each other and with management and as in-
dividuals compete for ever-scarcer jobs, it is even harder to encourage 
newer forms of integrative and collaborative bargaining and dispute 
resolution, though the necessity would seem even greater. 
V. The Way Forward? From Old 
Legacy to New Learning 
What is the legacy of the NLRA for dispute resolution and labor 
and employment rights? Is it better to separate purely economic condi-
tions of work from other, more social justice issues in the workplace? 
Should there be one form of dispute resolution for conventional labor 
73. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transfonnation of 
Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27I..Aw & Soc'y REv. 497, 521, 524 (1993) (arguing that 
requiring individual complaint processes to be kept inside the organization prevents 
publicity of wrongdoing, litigation, and systemic or class action types of relief). 
74. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds lot'} Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-77 (2010) 
(holding that class actions not permissible in arbitration unless explicitly agreed to by 
parties in pre-dispute contractual allocation to arbitration). See discussion supra notes 
~9. 
75. See Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in MARY PARKER FoLLETl'-
PRoPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A CELEBRATION OF WRlTlNGS FROM THE 19208, at 67, 67-86 (Pau-
line Graham ed., 1995). 
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collective interests and other forms for statutory claims? Or would 
it make sense for collective strength and individual rights to link all 
employment and labor interests within similar forms and methods of 
dispute resolution? What is the relation of substantive rights to pro-
cedures and processes for their enforcement? How are workers best 
served for fairness, equity, and justice in the workplace? What forms of 
process are available? How might collaborations form among workers, 
and among workers and management, to develop fairness and benefits 
for all? 
Many different issues are often conflated in consideration of these 
questions, and all too often the sides are polarized. Plaintiffs' lawyers 
in statutory employment cases seek elimination of compulsory pre: 
dispute arbitration processes, even though there is some evidence that 
some arbitration might, in fact, be cheaper, faster, and actually produce 
higher win rates (if lower damage awards) than court hearings. Ad-
vocates for employers resist with all their might76 the notion that the 
Employee Free Choice Act might provide for compulsory arbitration to 
create first contracts where employer delay can easily defeat a newly 
recognized union.77 These employer efforts to fight compulsory arbitra-
tion, after a clearly demarcated statutory negotiation period, assume 
that such arbitration would necessarily favor labor. 
In this odd matrix, different forms of arbitration are seen as 
bad for workers in the individual statutory rights context and good 
for workers in the organized union context. Mediation, though long a 
staple of labor relations and negotiations, seems lost in the middle of 
these loud claims for and against arbitration or litigation, despite its 
great success in some very difficult labor settings.78 Unions are seen 
as hostile to individual rights, which, in much of the rhetoric, actually 
has to do with other group-based rights. Strong-arm or overtly adver-
sarial negotiation or litigation processes are seen as the only way to 
win both labor rights and statutory employment claims. As a process 
pluralist,79 I have long been skeptical of the notion that anyone process 
is the only way to resolve a dispute. In current times, it appears that 
overly brittle conceptions of winners and losers in conventional labor 
negotiations, litigation, arbitration, and even political battles are not 
the way to move forward. Polarization on substantive issues has led to 
manipulation of all processes. 
76. See Epstein, supra note 17. 
77. Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Em· 
ployee Free ChoiceAct, 70 LA. L. REv. 47, 48 (2009). 
78. See, e.g., MOT! MORDEHAI MIRoNI, MEDIATION AND STRATEGIC CHANGE: LESSONS FRoM 
MEDIATING A NATIONWIDE DocToRS' STRIKE 4-5 (2008). 
79. CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEAoow ET AL., DISPUTE REsOLUTION: BEYOND THE AnVERSARIAL 
MODEL (2d ed. 2011). 
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As I see the legacy of the NLRA in the many different forms of 
dispute resolution it has spawned in labor relations, it seems now that 
labor relations must learn from the expansions, variations, and devel-
opments in those processes outside of the labor sphere. If we are to 
move forward in labor relations, we need to engage in problem-solving 
processes to lead to other conceptions of what to do and how to get 
to new outcomes in labor-management relations. There are some suc-
cesses in new conceptions oflabor-management partnerships and mul-
tiple-union coalitions, which may require suspension of some of the old 
adversarial paradigm.80 
As I first suggested in 1974,81 I still hope that the collective spirit 
of the NLRA might expand to embrace other workplace issues beyond 
labor-management relations. As we say in negotiation theory, the more 
issues available for trade, the better the chance of making a deal. To the 
extent that we can expand the issues of worker interests and rights and 
needs-such as wages, hours, retirement, retraining, education, work-
ing conditions, nondiscrimination, fair treatment, health care, worker 
dignity, family-work balance, and even social relationships82-and find 
processes for bargaining about all of these things together, the more 
likely we can improve the work lives of all workers. Thus, I prefer to 
talk about work or workers as more unifying and more inclusive terms 
than labor or employment or laborer or employee. Work is something we 
all do, and it can form the basis of a renewed collective consciousness in 
both bargaining for and resolving disputes about work. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be one distressing and perhaps 
counterproductive cultural understanding in many of these current is-
sues about work, rights, and legal processes. American culture is indi-
vidualistic. The NLRA of 1935 and the first few years of its enforcement 
were probably the high point of collective action on the part of work-
ers in the United States. Unlike in Europe, with higher rates of trade 
union membership and with greater statutory protection of work, the 
majority of American workers operate without formal statutory protec-
tions, without enforceable work rules, even without contract or formal 
agreement and are subject to totally individualized treatment in the 
workplace. 
Many applaud our culture of individual rights and freedoms, in-
cluding our right to sue on behalf of those individual rights. But often 
80. See, for example, the Kaiser-Permanente partnership described in KOCHAN ET 
AL., supra note 11. 
81. Many others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 50; 
STURM, supra note 50; Crain & Matheny, supra note 7. 
82. See generally ARLIE RUSSELL HocHScHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES 
HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1997). 
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the rhetoric does not match the reality. Workers may work for large and 
powerful companies that can dictate terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and many individuals may not have the resources to challenge 
even statutorily protected rights of nondiscrimination, wage rates, and 
worker safety and health. Many other countries have successfully used 
different methods of labor and employment regulation and dispute 
resolution.83 Ranging from work councils, to worker ownership or rep-
resentation on management committees, to state-organized mediation 
and arbitration agencies, to separate specialized employment tribunals 
to adjudicate all work and labor-related disputes, to the use of man-
dated mediation or arbitration processes, there are many other ways 
to conduct labor-management relations and resolve labor-management 
disputes. The United States has been pushing hard on its culture of in-
dividualism and entrepreneurial freedom in the workplace, yet we can 
no longer claim a bigger, more profitable, and more successful economy 
on these grounds. 
It is time for us to look for more and different ways to organize our 
collective work lives. As the NLRA has encouraged the development of 
different forms of dispute resolution, in its birthing of collective bar-
gaining and some forms of arbitration, we must now use a greater vari-
ety of different forms of dispute resolution to brainstorm and construct 
new forms of work relations and decision making in American business 
and government. Process matters, and newer forms of collective pro-
cesses in the workplace are more likely to generate more creative and 
newer forms of workplace options and worker justice. 
83. Matthew W. Finkin, Privatization of Wrongful Dismissal Protection in Com-
parative Perspective, 37OOu8. L.J. 149 (2008). 
